8/10
The Price of Gallipoli: 1939 - 1945
18 June 2008
Warning: Spoilers
I have mentioned (in reviewing the television film, CHURCHILL AND THE GENERALS) that Sir Winston had a tragically inflated view of his ideas on military strategy. In particular his constant insistence that the way to win wars against a Continental power (Germany) was to attack Europe by it's "soft underbelly". Twice the result was disaster. In World War II it would be the fight for the island of Crete, which actually was a bloodbath for both England and Germany. In World War I it was the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, best remembered for the name of one location in the straits involved: Gallipoli.

Churchill wanted to use a surprise attack on the Turks to force allied troops into Constantinople and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war (and provide a means of supplying the Tsar of Russia and his forces). The leadership of this enterprise was in General Sir Ian Hamilton, who was not an inspiring or clever leader. While he spent most of his time on a yacht in the Aegean, tens of thousands of Allied soldiers were killed in a series of stupid, costly attacks. Many of these casualties were known as "Anzacs". They were volunteer soldiers from the colonies of Australia and New Zealand. And in the end the campaign was a failure. The only positive achievements were that it brought pride to the Turks for defending their territory, and that it brought to the forefront their national hero Mustafa Kemal (later their President and modernizer, Kemal Ataturk).

The Australians were not happy at being used as useless cannon fodder. They had only unified the various colonies on the smallest continent in 1901, and this was (actually) their second experience in warfare that didn't benefit them. They had supplied troops for the second Anglo-Boer War (1899 - 1902) only to have a small flare-up of anger at the questionable court-martial and execution of "Breaker" Morant in that war. The Australians were mostly descended from convicts from Britain, and there were always questions about why they were loyal to the mother country that threw them out. Gallipoli made them even more suspicious.

With the coming of World War II the conflict between Britain and Australia would come to a head, and leave Britain with the realization that Australia was going to be less and less likely to be attached to them in the future. Churchill would be the first to discover this.

Churchill (Timothy West here) became Prime Minister in 1940 due to the failure of the campaign to save Norway from Nazi invasion. Churchill expected that the entire British Commonwealth of Nations would fully support the war effort (soon he would discover that Eamonn De Valera of Ireland was declaring neutrality for the duration, and there was nothing he could do about it). But most unexpected was Australia. The Southern Cross country had just had an election in which the perennially elected Tory Prime Minister Robert Menzies (John Wood) was defeated by John Curtin (Michael Blakemore) the Labor Party leader. This was unsettling to Churchill, but he figured that Australia would fall in line. It didn't happen that way. Curtin (whose cabinet included the Australian Prime Minister from World War I, Billy Hughes (Jon Ewing)) was suspicious of any British control over Australian troops. The cabinet (which was a coalition) agreed with him. Churchill tried to ignore this, but found his military ideas constantly being questioned by Curtin. After all, Churchill planned Gallipoli.

This television film follows how Curtin gradually pulled out all stops to insist that Australia controlled it's own military destiny. Unlike DeValera in Eire, Curtin faced a foe (the Japanese) who were soon attacking Port Moresby, and threatening invasion through New Guinea. He wanted all the Australian military reserves used for defending the homeland. Chuchill kept trying to send them to the Middle East and Europe. The crux of the confrontation was when Churchill tried to put Australian troops in Egypt (to bolster North African defenses) when Curtin objected. Churchill sent them to Singapore (closer to Australia geographically) where they were all captured when the "Gibraltar of the East" fell to Japan.

Slowly Curtin begins to reverse the history of Australia, and tie it's future to it's cousin country the United States. The commander of Australia's forces, General Tom Blamey (Ray Barrett) works closely with General Douglas MacArthur (Robert Vaughn) in the struggle in New Guinea. Blamey's men reverse the Japanese advance, allowing the Americans to send in reinforcements. MacArthur was always grateful and respectful to Blamey (who he made sure was present at the Japanese surrender on the U.S.S. Missouri in 1945). Curtin died before the war ended, but he knew that he had made his point to the mother country about his nation's coming of age. Churchill underplayed the slap in his face, but realized that Curtin's activities were one more step in the replacement of Britain by the U.S. as the world's superpower.

The film followed this little known story (little known here in the U.S.) quite well. Timothy West has played Churchill several times, and has the great man's brilliance and arrogance down pat. Blakemore plays Curtin as a decent man who finds a world crisis on his watch, and rises truly to the occasion. Wood is wasted - Menzies got stuck in London as part of the Imperial War Cabinet, so he was (oddly enough) out of the loop of Australian politics during much of the war. Ironically one side of his London period is ignored: in 1942 there was a move to try to replace Churchill. Menzies, with his long service as Australian Premier was seen as an alternative. But military news started improving, and the coup never occurred. As for Barrett as Blamey, he makes the General sympathetic by showing his struggles with a helpless Curtin for supplies, and slowly winning Vaughn's MacArthur's respect as a fighter. As a historical television film it was quite good,
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